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A recently released Turkish intelligence report concerning Trotsky

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After posting the full text accompanied by a brief introduction, let us now take a closer look at MAH’s 1932 intelligence report concerning Trotsky.

According to the information contained in the first paragraph of the document, a man named ‘Davranof’—whom MAH knew to be an agent of the Soviet intelligence organisation GPU—establishes contact with an interpreter of Armenian origin working for MAH, whose name has been redacted in the report.

The opening sentence of the report contains a notable error: Davranof is referred to as a ‘GPU agent’. However, by 1932, the official name of the Soviet intelligence apparatus was no longer GPU (Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravlenie), but OGPU (Ob"edinonnoye Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravlenie). In my view, this is precisely the kind of mistake that should never appear in an official report bearing the signature of a senior figure in a national intelligence organisation – in this case, the Istanbul Regional Chief.

The OGPU logo (1932)

The GPU was established in 1922 within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) to carry out internal security, intelligence, and counter-espionage operations. Created to succeed the Cheka, the GPU was placed under the authority of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD).

With the establishment of the USSR on 30 December 1922, the GPU’s [*] jurisdiction was expanded to cover the entire Soviet Union, and in 1923, it was renamed the OGPU. This organisation subsequently came under the direct authority of Sovnarkom (the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR).

On the other hand, the OGPU should not be seen merely as an expanded version of the GPU; there were significant differences between the mandates and authority of the two organisations. The OGPU not only broadened the GPU’s powers but also assumed additional responsibilities, such as border security and the fight against economic sabotage. While the GPU’s remit had been confined to internal security, intelligence, and counterespionage, the OGPU swiftly degenerated after 1924, becoming the principal instrument of the Stalinist bureaucracy’s repressive policies.

In this context, to refer to a Soviet agent operating in Istanbul in 1932 — nine years after the GPU had been replaced by the OGPU — as a ‘GPU agent’ constitutes a historical anachronism. There is no doubt whatsoever that Davranof was an ‘OGPU agent’.

Two years after the intelligence report under examination was written, in 1934, the OGPU was merged into the NKVD and continued its operations under the name of the commissariat (ministry) to which it was subordinate.

Was this terminological error the result of a lack of knowledge about Soviet institutions within Turkish intelligence at the time, or was it due to carelessness on the part of the report’s author? We cannot provide a definitive answer to this question. It is certainly possible that the term ‘GPU’ was used informally, almost out of habit. Nevertheless, based on my intuition, I believe the first explanation to be the more likely.

[*] On 30 December 1922, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Ukrainian SSR), the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (Byelorussian SSR), and the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (Transcaucasian SFSR) united to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

Suggested reading: For the expansion of the OGPU’s powers, see J. Arch Getty, Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered – 1933–1938 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 32–35.

To be continued