Document

A recently released Turkish intelligence report concerning Trotsky

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The tasks that OGPU agent Davranof instructed the Armenian translator (whose name has been redacted in the intelligence report under review) to carry out are as follows:

• To monitor Leon Trotsky, who was in exile on Büyükada, Istanbul, as closely as possible,
• To identify those visiting or leaving Trotsky’s residence,
• To ascertain his movements, destinations, and the people he meets,
• To determine his principal activities and preoccupations within his home,
• To uncover the identities of those with whom he maintains contact.

The house in Büyükada, Istanbul, where Trotsky lived between January 1932 and July 1933

As understood from the document, Davranof was unaware that the translator he had contacted was, in fact, working for MAH, the Turkish intelligence service. MAH, for its part, instructed the translator to maintain contact with Davranof without revealing his true affiliation. The aim, undoubtedly, was to seize this opportunity to obtain insider information on Soviet surveillance activities against Trotsky and to keep the OGPU’s operations under the closest possible scrutiny.

Further into the report, it becomes clear that Davranof also pressed the Armenian translator to reveal the identities of those responsible for Trotsky’s protection and surveillance. Although the translator initially regarded it as too risky to answer this question, he ultimately agreed to the OGPU agent’s request in line with MAH’s (the Turkish intelligence service’s) instructions. MAH even began preparations to mislead Davranof, stating, “We shall furnish Davranof with one name and one contact.” MAH saw this development not only as an opportunity to gather intelligence, but also as a chance to mount a counterintelligence operation to steer and deceive Soviet intelligence.

Emblem of MAH

The report expresses MAH’s intent as follows:

They will no doubt seek to verify this contact or bypass our agent altogether in order to gain direct access. This will enable us to identify some of Davranof’s operatives and discern their objectives.

These lines clearly reveal MAH’s efforts to identify the OGPU agent’s potential additional contacts and to ascertain the nature of the activities he sought to undertake.

To be continued