Behice Boran, the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the story Gökhan Atılgan left unfinished
A few days ago, I watched an interview in which historian Emrah Safa Gürkan spoke to researcher and author Gökhan Atılgan about Behice Boran’s academic and political life.
The interview has one fundamental omission: it makes no mention of Behice Boran’s Stalinist political line or of the decisive influence this had on her thinking and political practice. Gürkan did not raise the issue at any point during the interview, while Atılgan, for his part, presumably felt no need to broach what he regarded as a sensitive subject.
This fundamental omission is compounded by another story that is left unfinished in the discussion of the political and ideological divisions between Mehmet Ali Aybar and Behice Boran within the first TİP.
| Behice Boran |
It is true that the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 by Warsaw Pact forces under Soviet leadership - Romania did not participate - was neither the sole nor even the principal cause of the split within TİP. The disagreements between Aybar and the Boran-Aren group went back much further and covered a far broader range of issues, extending from the organisation of the party to their respective conceptions of socialism.
Yet that is not our main concern here. The problem is that Atılgan gives an incomplete account of Behice Boran’s position on the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Boran’s initial stance
A few days after the invasion, Behice Boran openly opposed the Soviet military intervention in an article entitled ‘Çekoslovakya Olayları: Sosyalist Demokrasi ve Ulusal Bağımsızlık’ (‘The Events in Czechoslovakia: Socialist Democracy and National Independence’), published in Milliyet on 27 August 1968.
She stated that the intervention violated the principles of national independence, socialism and socialist internationalism. She argued that the political system which had taken shape in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe under Stalin was not a model of socialism worthy of emulation. The system known as the ‘dictatorship of the working class’, she wrote, had degenerated into the arbitrary rule first of the party, then of a particular group within the party, and ultimately of a single individual.
Whether the article was, as Atılgan claims, theoretically ‘extraordinary’ is open to debate. What is beyond doubt, however, is that Boran took a firm and unequivocal stand against the Soviet intervention.
Atılgan’s account of Boran’s position on the invasion of Czechoslovakia stops there.
Yet there is more to the story.
Boran’s U-turn
Behice Boran subsequently abandoned altogether the views she had defended in 1968.
In the lengthy interview conducted by Uğur Mumcu in 1986 and later published as Bir Uzun Yürüyüş (A Long March), she acknowledged that she had openly criticised and condemned the invasion in her article for Milliyet. She added, however, that she had come to recognise the errors in the article over time.Boran maintained that her position had not been the same as Aybar’s. While describing her own article as a mistaken ‘assessment of the situation’ concerning a particular event, she characterised Aybar’s position as outright ‘anti-Sovietism’.
She says that in 1968 she regarded Dubček and those around him as healthy forces capable of renewing the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, but later came to realise that this assessment had been mistaken. She presents the party’s subsequent recovery following the Soviet intervention as evidence that her initial assessment had been wrong and as a vindication of her U-turn.
We are therefore not dealing with a minor correction or a mere shift in emphasis. Whereas in 1968 Boran had condemned the Soviet intervention as contrary to socialism, internationalism and national independence, she later repudiated that assessment and fully embraced the official line of the Stalinist Kremlin bureaucracy on Czechoslovakia.
In the view of the present writer, to defend the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces is to support a reactionary military intervention undertaken by the Stalinist bureaucracy to crush the growing movement of the working class. [*]
| Mehmet Ali Aybar |
A deliberate omission
Gökhan Atılgan is the author of a comprehensive biography of Behice Boran and has studied her political career for many years. I should also make clear that I have not yet read Atılgan’s book. Nor are we passing judgement here on a book we have not read. It is, however, inconceivable that Atılgan could be unaware of Boran’s 1986 interview with Uğur Mumcu or of the fact that she subsequently abandoned the views she had expressed in 1968.
To praise Boran’s article in Milliyet at such length, without so much as mentioning that she later repudiated its analysis as mistaken, does not strike me as a simple lapse of memory.
In claiming to correct a widely accepted narrative, Atılgan paradoxically constructs another misleading account in its place.
To tell only the first half of the story is not to reveal the truth, but to leave it unfinished.
[*] On the night of 20-21 August 1968, 165,000 troops and 4,600 tanks from the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria invaded Czechoslovakia. At least 137 civilians were killed in the first few days, while the total death toll eventually reached around 500. Dubček and his allies were arrested and taken to Moscow, and were released only after signing the secret ‘Moscow Protocol’. The working class mounted the strongest resistance to the invasion. General strikes took place on 21, 22 and 23 August, and workers’ councils were established in hundreds of workplaces. The self-immolation of the student Jan Palach, and the transformation of his funeral into a demonstration attended by hundreds of thousands, testified to the depth of the resistance.
[**] A legitimate question may be asked: what political position should have been taken amid the events themselves? We endorse the position adopted by the Fourth International. The invasion should, of course, have been condemned as a reactionary and criminal act by the Stalinist bureaucracy. At the same time, however, no political support should have been given to the reformist faction of the bureaucracy headed by Dubček. [Their ill-treatment and torture should, of course, have been opposed uncompromisingly.] It should have been stressed that the solution lay in an independent political revolution by the working class against the Stalinist bureaucracy. Support should have been given neither to the Warsaw Pact tanks ‘restoring order’ nor to the programme of capitalist restoration advanced by the reformist wing of the bureaucracy.
See also: Katushev’s report and Behice Boran’s defence of the occupation of Czechoslovakia