Candan Badem’s changing view:
From denial to an apologist’s acceptance
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| Candan Badem |
I return to this subject once again. Regular readers of this
blog will by now be used to this: I continue to examine the Stalin leadership’s
demands for Turkish territory and bases in the Straits through the various
sources I come across. Links to my previous articles can be found below.
This time, however, I shall focus not on a new diplomatic
document or the memoirs of a Soviet leader, but on two articles by the same
author, published seven years apart.
The author is the Stalinist historian Candan Badem. His
first article appeared on soL Haber on 4 November 2008 under the
pseudonym Kıvılcım Çağla. Its title posed a question: “Stalin Kars ve Ardahan’ı
İstedi mi?” (Did Stalin Demand Kars and Ardahan?). His second article appeared
on İleri Haber on 28 September 2015 under the title “Bir kez daha Kars,
Ardahan ve Stalin” (Once Again: Kars, Ardahan and Stalin).[1]
Reading the two articles back to back is highly instructive.
The differences between them are not merely a matter of new information being
added. Badem’s conclusion also changes. But has accepting the historical fact
been enough for him to move away from the political outlook that previously led
him to deny it? That is the question I wish to explore.
No written diplomatic note, no demand?
In his 2008 article, Badem argues that it has not been
proven that the Soviet Union demanded territory from Turkey. He also sets his
own criterion for what would count as proof: a written diplomatic note from
Stalin or the Soviet government must be produced.
There is a fundamental methodological problem here. Can the
fact that a foreign minister conveyed a demand to another country’s ambassador
be established only if that demand was also set out in a diplomatic note? Why
should records of meetings, testimony from those involved, discussions of the
same issue with other states, and mutually corroborating documents not count as
sufficient evidence?
Investigating whether such a diplomatic note exists is, of
course, necessary. But insisting that a single type of document drawn up in a
particular form is indispensable as proof narrows the scope of historical
research; in this case, it also serves as a line of defence that deliberately
excludes other sources capable of confirming Stalin’s territorial demands.
Badem’s 2015 article itself brings this problem into focus.
In that article, too, he states that no official Soviet note concerning the
territorial demand has come to light. Yet he now accepts that the demand was
made.
So it is possible to reach that conclusion without a written
diplomatic note after all.
New documents and an old criterion
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| Chuyev and Molotov in front of a portrait of Stalin |
In his second article, Badem states that he has obtained new information from Russian, Armenian and British archives. He cites documents published by the Armenian State Archives, Cemil Hasanlı’s research and Molotov’s conversations with Feliks Chuyev as the basis for his assessment.
Yet it is not just the amount of information that has
changed. The requirement that a particular form of proof must be produced, laid
down in the earlier article, is also abandoned in practice. Alongside the new
conclusion, we are therefore entitled to expect an explanation of why the old
criterion was mistaken.
Moreover, Molotov’s conversations were a source Badem had
already used in 2008. The issue, therefore, is not simply one of archives that
became available later. The way an already available source was read and
interpreted also needs to be questioned.
In earlier articles, I examined Molotov’s statements
acknowledging that demands had been made for Turkish territory and bases in the
Straits. The difference between Badem’s two articles is also striking in their
use of this source.
Who was responsible for the acknowledged demand?
In his 2015 article, Badem now accepts that the Soviet
leadership demanded territory from Turkey. He argues that Stalin acted with
excessive self-confidence and was unrealistic. He also notes that this move
drew Turkey closer to the United States.
Yet in explaining the demands, he gives considerable weight
to the expectations of Georgia and Armenia. He argues that the Soviet
leadership sought to satisfy these republics.
This explanation recalls the narrative we previously
encountered when examining official Soviet historiography. There is, however, a
difference: Badem explicitly acknowledges Stalin’s responsibility. Even so, by
explaining the policy in terms of a desire to satisfy the republics, he
relegates the Kremlin’s own strategic objectives to the background.
Of course, such expectations may well have existed in
Georgia and Armenia. But expectations within those republics and their
translation into Soviet foreign policy are two different matters. A foreign
policy initiative on this scale, especially under Stalin, could not possibly
have been pursued independently of the central leadership and Stalin himself.
Responsibility for advancing these demands through diplomatic channels lay with
the Kremlin bureaucracy and with Stalin at its head.
Indeed, Badem’s own account refers to Stalin’s insistence
and the instructions he gave to Molotov. The same text therefore also shows
that the question of responsibility cannot be explained away by reference to
the republics’ expectations.
Where does the 1940 record fit into this explanation?
Badem states that the Soviet leadership wanted to obtain
territory from Turkey, which had pursued a pro-German policy throughout the
war. The demands are thus presented largely as a response to Turkey’s wartime
conduct and are, at least in part, justified on that basis.
Yet the history of the Soviet objective of securing bases in the Straits reveals the limits of this explanation.
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| Molotov in conversation with Adolf Hitler (1940) |
Moreover, during this discussion, Stalin expresses support
for Bulgaria’s territorial claims against Turkey and also speaks of driving the
Turks into Asia.
None of this, of course, proves that the specific
territorial demands advanced in 1945 had already been worked out in every
detail five years earlier. The details must have changed in various ways over
the intervening five years. Yet it is clear that the objective of securing
bases in the Straits did not arise solely as a reaction to Turkey’s wartime
conduct. That objective already existed when the Soviet Union was negotiating
with Nazi Germany. Stalin’s remarks, as recorded in Dimitrov’s diary, clearly
show that in 1940 he was contemplating reducing Turkey’s size by taking
territory from it in both the west and the east.
Does the Turkish bourgeoisie’s choice justify Stalin?
The most problematic part of the second article, however, is
its conclusion.
Badem argues that the Turkish bourgeoisie’s preference for
integration with the West predated the Soviet demands. There is some validity
to this observation. To explain Turkey’s turn towards the United States and its
entry into NATO solely in terms of Stalin’s demands would be to overlook the
decisive influence of world-historical developments, domestic class relations
and the choices made by the ruling classes.
Yet it does not follow that the Stalin leadership’s
responsibility is diminished. The Turkish bourgeoisie’s desire for integration
with the West and the impact of Soviet policy on that process can be examined
together; indeed, that is how the issue ought to be analysed.
Badem, however, concludes his article by arguing that those
who do not oppose Turkey’s transformation into a US and NATO base cannot object
to the Soviet demand for joint bases.
This line of reasoning may expose the inconsistency and
hypocrisy of such circles. It does not, however, demonstrate that the Soviet
demand was justified.
Moreover, it does not address a socialist position that
opposes both US military and political domination of Turkey and the Stalin
leadership’s demands for territory and bases. Why should we have to choose
between the two?
What comes after denial?
Badem’s second article differs from the first. His
acknowledgement that the demands were made and his criticism of Stalin’s policy
are significant. This change deserves recognition.
Yet the standard of proof set in the first article remains
unquestioned; in the second, the acknowledgement of the historical fact is
followed by explanations that limit responsibility and seek to invalidate
criticism on the basis of the critic’s political identity.
Thus, the defence retreats in the face of historical fact,
only to continue on another level.
We do not need to defend Stalin’s reactionary foreign policy
to criticise the anti-communism of Turkey’s ruling classes and their ties to
imperialism. Once defending socialism is treated as necessarily entailing the
justification of Stalin’s demands for territory and bases, historical facts
themselves begin to be distorted to suit the needs of that defence. This is
precisely the method Stalinist apologetics has always employed.
[1] Kıvılcım Çağla, “Stalin Kars ve Ardahan’ı İstedi mi?”, soL
Haber, 4 November 2008; Candan Badem, “Bir kez daha Kars, Ardahan ve Stalin”, İleri Haber, 28 September 2015. The date of the second article
is taken from a record of the page preserved in search engine results.
Previous articles on the subject:
Crashing into the hard truth while trying to turn history on its head
Molotov Speaks: territorial and Straits base demands on Turkey in 1945
What do Khrushchev’s memoirs tell us?
The Kremlin’s mid-1970s “diplomatic” manoeuvre
A demand predating 1945: Bases in the Straits






