What do Khrushchev’s memoirs tell us?

The question of the Soviet territorial demands on Turkey

Nikita Khrushchev, who was the de facto leader of the Soviet Union from the mid-1950s until 1964, states quite plainly in the second volume of his memoirs [*] that, at the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union did indeed demand territory from Turkey: 

West Germany at that time had no influence on world politics, being an occupied country subject to the dictates of the occupiers, who were pursuing an aggressive policy. Their reconnaissance planes flew almost uninterruptedly over East Germany and Czechoslovakia, especially in the border areas. Such flights continued even after Stalin’s death. Then they began to fly over the territory of Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, violating our borders along the Black Sea coast and other seacoasts, and strengthening their positions in Turkey, because under Stalin the USSR had ruined its relations with Turkey by making claims to its territory. Beria egged Stalin on over the Turkish question. He proposed that we officially approach Turkey and present our territorial claims. This policy drove the Turks into the arms of the United States. American spies began operating right along the border of Soviet Transcaucasia. They used one expedition, which was supposedly hunting for traces of Noah’s Ark, to reconnoiter the approaches to Armenia around Mount Ararat. That was the kind of situation that had taken shape, which Stalin, especially after the defeat in Korea, evaluated as a prewar situation. (pp. 426-427)

Khrushchev emphasises the following points in this passage:

• As the Second World War was drawing to a close, territorial demands were made on Turkey.
• This policy drove Turkey into the arms of the United States.
• As a result, the security of the Soviet Union was weakened and the position of the imperialist camp was strengthened.

From left to right: Voroshilov, Beria, Khrushchev, and Malenkov at Stalin’s funeral (1953).

The passage also draws attention to the emphasis placed on Lavrentiy Beria’s role in Soviet policy towards Turkey. Khrushchev claims that it was Beria who encouraged Stalin in this matter and led him down the wrong path. Yet this assessment should be treated with caution. During Stalin’s rule, the principal architect of Soviet foreign policy was Stalin himself. In all the reading I have done to date, I have not encountered any evidence suggesting that Beria, despite his considerable influence over the security apparatus, occupied a central position in foreign-policy decision-making. It is therefore highly likely that Khrushchev exaggerated the negative role he attributes to Beria in this regard. One obvious reason for this is Khrushchev’s own bitter political confrontation with Beria. After Stalin’s death, Khrushchev was among the leaders who organised Beria’s removal and played a key role in the process that led to his execution.

Molotov

Molotov, often described as Stalin’s “right-hand man” and who served at the time as foreign minister, openly acknowledged in his long conversations with the Soviet journalist and writer Felix Chuyev that the Soviet Union did indeed demand territory from Turkey in 1945. [**] He describes the substance of these demands in more concrete terms than Khrushchev. Yet, unlike Khrushchev, Molotov seeks to defend the rationale behind this policy and presents it as a legitimate security requirement.

Molotov’s reasoning here can be summarised as follows:

• Turkey did not behave in a friendly manner towards the Soviet Union during the war.
• The Straits were of vital importance to Soviet security.
• For this reason, the Soviet Union (Stalin) was justified in seeking a stronger position.

From Molotov’s perspective, the real problem was that these demands were not diplomatically realistic. He also acknowledges that, precisely because they were unrealistic and failed to produce the desired outcome, this initiative accelerated Turkey’s turn towards the imperialist Western camp.

Although Khrushchev and Molotov offer different political assessments, they converge on two essential points: the Soviet Union did in fact demand territory from Turkey, and this policy accelerated Turkey’s rapprochement with the imperialist camp.

As a result, two mutually hostile testimonies, despite their inevitable differences in emphasis, confirm the same historical fact.

[*] Nikita Khrushchev, Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, vol. 2: Reformer (1945-1964), ed. Sergei Khrushchev, trans. George Shriver (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006).

After his removal from office, Khrushchev lived a relatively isolated life near Moscow, during which he recorded lengthy memoirs. These memoirs were later translated into English in three volumes, published at different times over a period of roughly twenty years.

The first volume, published in 1970 under the title Khrushchev Remembers, was edited and translated by Strobe Talbott.

Its Turkish translation began to be serialised in the newspaper Milliyet that same year. One year later, in February 1971, the book was published by Milliyet Yayınları under the title Kruşçev'in Anıları. Issued in two volumes as part of the publisher’s “Tarih Dizisi” (History Series), the first volume was translated from English into Turkish by Mehmet Harmancı, and the second by M. Ali Kayabal.

The second volume, published in 1974 under the title Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, was likewise edited and translated by Strobe Talbott.

Yalçın Küçük

The passage concerning the Soviet demand for territory from Turkey also appears in this volume. It is therefore clear that Yalçın Küçük - who claimed in his 1979 book Türkiye Üzerine Tezler 2 (Theses on Turkey 2) that the Soviet Union had not demanded territory from Turkey or bases in the Straits in 1945, dismissing this as a “Cold War fable”, and who went on to repeat this assertion in later years - either did not read Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament or, if he did, chose to disregard it. The same, of course, applies to the Stalinists in Turkey who repeated this “thesis” like parrots for years.

The third volume, published in 1990 under the title Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, was edited by Jerrold L. Schecter and Vyacheslav Luchkov.

In the early 2000s, a more academic and systematic three-volume series was published under the editorship of Khrushchev’s son, Sergei Khrushchev:

• Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume 1: Commissar (1918-1945) - 2004
• Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume 2: Reformer (1945-1964) - 2006
• Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume 3: Statesman (1953-1964) - 2007

These English-language volumes were prepared on the basis of the four-volume Russian original (N. S. Khrushchev: Vremia, liudi, vlast’), published in 1999 by the Moskovskiye Novosti publishing house.

[**] Feliks Çuyev, Molotov Anlatıyor: Stalin’in sağkolu ile yapılan 140 görüşme, trans. Ayşe Hacıhasanoğlu and Suna Kabasakal, Yordam Kitap, revised and expanded 2nd edn, Istanbul, March 2010, pp. 116-118.

See also:

The Kremlin’s mid-1970s “diplomatic” manoeuvre: The rewritten history of the demands for territory and bases in the Straits

Molotov Anlatıyor [Molotov Speaks]: territorial and Straits base demands on Turkey in 1945 - A comparison of the first and expanded second editions

Crashing into the hard truth while trying to turn history on its head